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INTER-SECTOR RELATIONS IN THE PORTUGUESE 




Financial crises are relatively rare events. However, when they occur, they imply very high costs both 
in terms of economic activity in the short run and long term economic growth. In particular, the ﬁ  nan-
cial crisis that began in 2007 has had strong consequences on global economic activity, justifying the 
deﬁ  nition of new policies targeting the implementation of a more transparent international ﬁ  nancial 
architecture, where the dominant micro-prudential vision is complemented by a broader approach. 
In this context, it is most important to understand the mechanisms underlying the outbreak of sys-
temic risk. In particular, ﬁ  nancial stability analysis needs to address the interconnections between all 
players in the economy. As long as these inter-linkages constitute the main channels through which 
shocks are propagated, understanding them can help to detect the mechanics behind shock trans-
mission and systemic risk. 
Traditionally, the literature in ﬁ  nancial stability focuses either on ﬁ  nancial institutions per se or on the 
relations among them. More recently, this analysis has been extended to the private non-ﬁ  nancial 
and public sectors. Examples are the works of Gray (1999), Setser, Allen, Keller, Rosenberg and 
Roubini (2002), Gapen, Gray, Lim and Xiao (2004, 2008) and Gray (2008). These studies rely on the 
identiﬁ  cation of unstable positions in sector balance-sheets. However, by focusing their analysis on 
emerging markets crises, especially those in Southeast Asia (1997) and Brazil (2002), these studies 
lack some generality as they concentrate on economies subject to currency risk. Thus, these crises 
should not be taken as example for countries that have most of their activity concentrated in their own 
currency, as is the case with countries in the euro area and the US. The last three articles stand out 
from the ﬁ  rst two by incorporating contingent claim analysis as developed by Merton (1974) follow-
ing the work of Black and Scholes (1973). Unlike other approaches that rely either on accounting or 
macroeconomic analysis, Merton’s model (as it is also known) takes into account markets uncertainty 
and the nonlinearities intrinsic to debt valuation. The model leads to a set of objective metrics that are 
easy to calculate and interpret. However, none of these articles have a global view on the economy 
and the transmission mechanism across sectors.
Broadening the scope of the analysis, Gray, Merton and Bodie (2007) proposed to apply Merton’s   Part II  | Articles
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model to an economy composed of ﬁ  ve sectors, which are seen as a set of balance sheets inter-
related by equity and implicit guarantees on debt payments. However, there are still few empirical 
applications. Recently, Castrén and Kavonius (2009) developed a network of bilateral relations for 
the main sectors of the euro area. Once built, this network introduces the nonlinearities common in 
risk transmission mechanisms through contingent claim analysis. This study broadly follows the lat-
ter. However, two major changes are introduced, namely, losses (or gains) related with credit risk are 
taken into account and households’ real estate assets are included in their balance sheets. 
This study is composed of 7 sections. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 builds a network of bi-
lateral relations within the Portuguese economy and explains the shock transmission system. Section 
4 presents the Merton model and applies it to the Portuguese economy. Section 5 proceeds with the 
simulation of two shocks based on the transmission model presented in section 3, namely, a sudden 
loss on non-ﬁ  nancial corporations equity and an increase in credit impairment. Section 6 discusses 
the limitations of the analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2. THE DATA
The data used in this study corresponds to the Portuguese non-consolidated national ﬁ  nancial ac-
counts compiled and published quarterly by Banco de Portugal. These accounts are a synthetic 
representation of the ﬁ  nancial structure of the economy. This data is broadly organized in matrix 
form with eight sectors (non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, central bank, other monetary ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions, other ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, insurance companies and pension funds, general government, 
households and the rest of world)1 and seven types of ﬁ  nancial instruments (monetary gold and 
special drawing rights, currency and deposits, securities other than shares, loans, shares, insurance 
and other accounts receivable). Monetary gold and special drawing rights were excluded from the 
analysis since they have no counterparty sector.2 In order to simplify the exposition, shares and in-
surance were joined.3 All transactions are recorded in accordance with the double entry principle. In 
practice, all assets have a counterparty liability. This generates a closed system useful for studying 
shock propagation channels. Given its matrix form, this allows not only to assess the role of the ﬁ  -
nancial sector as an intermediary in the economy, but also estimate each sector leverage ratio, which 
is an important resilience indicator. In addition, it is possible to determine the net ﬁ  nancial position of 
resident sectors in relation with the rest of the world, revealing their degree of immunity to external 
shocks. Unfortunately, this data does not have any information on the real side of the economy. For 
instance, household real estate assets and non-ﬁ  nancial corporations capital stock are not taken into 
account. 
Chart 1 breaks down each sector balance-sheet instrument-by-instrument for the fourth quarter of 
(1)  The acronyms OMFI, OFI and INS will be henceforth used to refer to other monetary ﬁ nancial institutions, other ﬁ nancial intermediaries and insurance 
companies and pension funds, respectively. Non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, general government and the rest of the world appear in charts as NFC, GOV 
and RoW, respectively.
(2)  This instrument is however considered to calculate central bank’s equity under the contingent claim analysis model.
(3)  In order to facilitate exposition, these instruments shall be henceforth referred only as “deposits”, “debt”, “loans”, “shares” and “other”.  Articles | Part  II
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Chart 1
DECOMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS BY SECTOR AND INSTRUMENT FOR 2009 Q4
Values in billion Euros
Source: Banco de Portugal (National Financial Accounts).












































































Rest of the World A
L  Part II  | Articles
Banco de Portugal |   Financial Stability Report November 2010 4
2009.4 Based on each sector net ﬁ  nancial position, one can distinguish three types of sectors. Non-
ﬁ  nancial corporations and the general government have a negative net ﬁ  nancial position. Regarding 
non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, this is mostly due to their relatively large capital stock, while for the general gov-
ernment it should roughly reﬂ  ect the consecutive budget deﬁ  cits incurred. On the other side, house-
holds and the rest of the world show a largely positive net ﬁ  nancial position, which in the latter case 
corresponds to the accumulation of successive balance of payments deﬁ  cits. Finally, all ﬁ  nancial 
institutions (central bank, OMFI, OFI and INS) have a relatively balanced ﬁ  nancial position. Among 
ﬁ  nancial institutions the high value of assets and liabilities of OMFI reﬂ  ects their role as ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries in the economy.
On an instrument basis, for all sectors but ﬁ  nancial institutions, the asset side of the balance sheet 
consists broadly of “deposits” and “shares”. In addition, non-ﬁ  nancial corporations have some of 
their assets invested in “other” and “loans”, which should correspond mainly to trade credit. The rest 
of the world has also an important part of its assets invested in “debt”.5 In contrast, ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions assets correspond mostly to “loans” (OMFI and OFI) and “debt” (INS)6. The central bank has 
its assets spread between “debt” and “deposits”. Liability positions vary widely among sectors. For 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, they correspond mostly to “shares” issued and “loans” from ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions. Among ﬁ  nancial institutions, one can ﬁ  nd very different situations. While the central bank and 
OMFI liabilities correspond mostly to “deposits” and to a lesser extent “debt”, OFI liabilities are largely 
composed by “shares”. Regarding the central bank, notice that the value assigned to “deposits” refers 
largely to liabilities under the TARGET payment system. General government liabilities correspond 
predominantly to “debt”. Households have most of their liabilities under mortgage “loans”. Finally, the 
rest of the world has its liabilities spread between “debt”, “deposits” and “shares”.
Table 1 shows each sector net ﬁ  nancial position, i.e. the difference between ﬁ  nancial assets and 
ﬁ  nancial liabilities. The data is shown as a percentage of total ﬁ  nancial assets of the economy for 
(4)  In order to facilitate the analysis developed in Section 4, “shares” of non-listed companies have been adjusted to reﬂ ect price movements in ﬁ  nancial 
markets.
(5)  Regarding households, notice that 40% of their investments in “shares” correspond to their positions in insurance companies and pension funds.
(6)  Notice that most of OFI “loans” correspond to long term loans to OMFI as counterpart of credit securitizations.
Table 1
SECTOR NET FINANCIAL POSITION IN 
PERCENTAGE OF THE ECONOMY’S TOTAL 
FINANCIAL ASSETS IN 2009 Q4
Portugal Euro area
NFC -13.8% -8.4%
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the fourth quarter of 2009.7 The results obtained are very similar to those presented by Castrén and 
Kavonius (2009) for the euro area. The exceptions are non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, which have a more 
negative position as compared with the euro area, and the rest of the world, which shows a more 
positive position. However, in this case the numbers are not comparable, since euro area values do 
not correspond to country averages, but the rest of the world position regarding the whole euro area.
3. THE SHOCK TRANSMISSION MECHANISM 
Inter-sector exposure plays an essential role in the way shocks are transmitted in the economy. 
Unfortunately, for instruments other than “deposits” and “loans”, national ﬁ  nancial accounts do not 
contain information on bilateral balance sheet positions (also known as who-to-whom accounts). 
Nevertheless, these can be estimated through maximum entropy as done in several studies on the in-
terbank loans market (e.g. Sheldon and Maurer (1998), Upper and Worms (2004) and Wells (2004)).8 
Castrén and Kavonius (2009) also use this methodology. 
Consider that bilateral balance sheet positions between two sectors in a given instrument k  can be 
represented by a NN ×  matrix where N represents the number of sectors and 
k
ij x  the exposure of 
sector i to sector  j in instrument k :
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i a  and 
k
j l  correspond to total assets and total liabilities of sector i  and  j  in instru-
ment k , respectively.
In addition, consider that 
k
i a  and 
k
j l  may be seen as the components of  ()
k fa  and  ()
k fl , the 
marginal distributions of assets and liabilities, respectively, and that 
k
ij x  is the realization of the joint 
distribution (,)
k fa l . Assuming independence, or maximum entropy, it comes that 
k
ij x can be esti-
mated as the product of the two marginal distributions. In order to improve results, two restrictions 
were imposed a posteriori: intra-rest of the world positions were eliminated and the central bank was 
considered to be entirely owned by the general government.9 In order to preserve equality between 
assets and liabilities for each instrument, the RAS algorithm was applied as described by Schneider 
and Zenios (1990).
Deﬁ  ne gross exposure between two sectors as the sum of bilateral assets and liabilities across in-
struments. Despite simple, this measure uncovers the major inter-sector and intra-sector relations 
(7)  In opposition to all other sections in this study, to facilitate comparison with the euro area, ﬁ  gures on unlisted “shares” were not adjusted to reﬂ ect 
stock price movements. Total ﬁ nancial assets in the economy include ﬁ nancial assets from the rest of the world.
(8)  This estimation procedure is also frequently used in input-output analysis (see Lahr e De Mesnard (2004)).
(9)  Additionally, it was considered that all long-term debt issued by the central bank until the fourth quarter of 2004 was wholly owned by MFIs.   Part II  | Articles
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taking place in the economy. Chart 2 shows gross bilateral exposure between all sectors for the 
Portuguese economy in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2002 and the fourth quarter of 2009.10 This representation 
allows us to draw three conclusions. First, the ﬁ  nancial sector plays an essential role in the economy, 
not only as an intermediary of ﬁ  nancial resources but also as a large holder of “shares” and “debt” 
of non-ﬁ  nancial corporations. Moreover, this role has grown steadily over the last decade. Secondly, 
notice the progressive interconnection of the rest of the world with all other sectors as result of the 
growing process of economic and ﬁ  nancial integration at the European and global levels. Finally, one 
should be aware of the high intra-sector exposure both of non-ﬁ  nancial corporations and ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. For non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, this is mostly due to cross holdings of “shares”, “other” 
and “loans”. For ﬁ  nancial institutions, despite the strong growth shown in the graph, this may be spuri-
ous, since it is largely associated with the introduction of IAS (International Accounting Standards) in 
2005, which made the securitized assets derecognition process substantially more demanding. Since 
securitization vehicles are included in OFI, this change in accounting standards had implications on 
this sector assets growth rate.
Chart 2 is a simpliﬁ  cation of reality in the sense that it does not distinguish neither assets and liabili-
ties nor equity and debt, which limits its use in analysing shock transmission. Nevertheless, taking 
these differences into account, it is possible to have a richer characterization of the ﬁ  nancial inter-
mediation process. In particular, we may have more insights on the shock transmission mechanism 
across sectors. Regarding the latter, it should be emphasized the contributions of Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997, 2002), Boissay (2006), Battiston, Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald and Stiglitz (2007) and 
Gray et al. (2007) to the rationalization of these channels. Shortly, the chain transmission mechanism 
works as follows. Consider that ﬁ  nancial assets held by each sector can be classiﬁ  ed in two types: 
equity (“shares”) and debt (“deposits”, “debt”, “loans” and “other”). Additionally, assume that all these 
(10) In order to simplify the analysis, the central bank, OMFI, OFI and INS were all joined in a single node. 
Chart 2
BILATERAL GROSS EXPOSURE IN 2002 Q1 AND 2009 Q4
Source: Banco de Portugal (National Financial Accounts).
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instruments are constantly valued at market prices. In this model, any shock is likely to be transmit-
ted in either of two ways. On the one hand, equity holders of the sector that suffers the shock bear a 
loss (or gain) in proportion to their share. Second, given debt contingency on total assets, any shock 
that produce changes in debt’s quality also generate immediate losses (gains) to those sectors that 
hold this type of assets. These losses must be then distributed across all sectors that hold equity from 
those sectors that have previously registered losses and so on until the shock is totally dissipated. 
Note however that, in theory, nothing ensures that the shock is dissipated before any sector has 
disappeared due to exhaustion of its equity base. When this happens it is said that the shock does 
not converge.
In order to better understand the transmission mechanism, consider an iterative system where losses 
related to any of these routes are calculated and distributed at the end of each iteration. Thus, each 
sector assumes not only losses corresponding to the sum of products between its exposure to the 
equity of each loss-registering sector and their losses but also the sum of the products between 
its debt exposure to each loss-registering sector and the losses caused by the deterioration of its 
debt quality.11 Denominate each of these outcomes as effect 1 and effect 2, respectively. These ef-
fects have two very different economic interpretations. While effect 1 corresponds to losses actually 
incurred by each sector, effect 2 considers creditors’ expected losses as the result of changes in 
borrowers’ likelihood of default and losses given default. In the absence of credit risk, i.e. assuming 
that all economic agents are going to fulﬁ  l their contractual responsibilities, effect 2 is not present. As 
regards the shock transmission mechanism presented, and unlike losses related to equity holdings 
(effect 1), which are easy to infer based on previous iterations, losses related with changes in debt 
quality (effect 2) require the adoption of a debt pricing model. Section 4 presents contingent claim 
analysis as a way of quantifying these losses. 
4. CONTINGENT CLAIM ANALYSIS
4.1. The model
Contingent claim analysis appeals to Merton’s model (1974) to assess the creditworthiness of a debt 
issuer, which we will call the “ﬁ  rm”, but which could be a whole economic sector. Consider a ﬁ  rm that 
issues debt at a given time with a certain maturity. The question that arises is whether the ﬁ  rm has 
enough assets to honour its obligations at maturity. The ﬁ  rm will honour its commitments if the value 
of its assets exceed, at maturity, its debt. If not, the ﬁ  rm declares bankruptcy and all assets are liq-
uidated to creditors. The negative difference between assets and liabilities will then be debt holders’ 
losses. Deciding on whether or not to pay back debt at maturity is very similar to exercising a call 
option. In this context, the option holder will buy the underlying asset if its market price at maturity 
exceeds the strike price. Otherwise, the call option is not exercised. In our case, the underlying asset 
corresponds to all assets of the ﬁ  rm while the exercise price is the nominal value of debt. It follows 
that the market value of debt should be equal to its face value discounted by a risk-free interest rate 
(11) Note that since our analysis use non-consolidated data, a particular sector may keep building up further losses inside it. Hypothetically, in an extreme 
case, if the whole equity of a given sector was held by the sector itself, it would generate a cycle that invariably would end in its own destruction.  Part II  | Articles
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less the value of a put option on the ﬁ  rm. That is, in the absence of arbitrage opportunities, investors 
should be indifferent between taking an amount of riskless debt, or take the same amount at risk but 
ensuring that, in case of non-repayment, they can recover the difference between what they have 
received (the asset value of the ﬁ  rm) and what they should have received (debt repayment). This is 
achieved through the put option. In practice, knowing a ﬁ  rm’s equity market value, the volatility of its 
equity returns, its nominal debt and the risk-free interest rate, one can use contingent claim analysis 
to calculate a series of risk measures, namely the distance to distress, the probability of default and 
the ex-ante expected loss. 
Consider that A , B  and E  correspond respectively to assets, debt and equity market value for 
a given ﬁ  rm or sector. If there are no market frictions and assuming all assets are liquid in maturity, 
we have that 
AEB =+ (2)
i.e. the market value of equity should equal the difference between assets and the market value of the 
risky debt. Suppose that A  follows a stochastic diffusion process with a deterministic trend governed 
by the risk-free return. Consider that at  0 t = , the ﬁ  rm issues zero coupon bonds with nominal value 
T B  amounting to all its liabilities. This ﬁ  rm is bankrupted if the value of its assets, A , is lower than 
T B  at maturity.
It follows that, in accordance with option pricing theory, the equity market value of the ﬁ  rm, E , equals 
an European call option on the underlying assets,  A , with maturity tT =  and strike price equal to 
its nominal debt, T B . Applying Itô’s lemma, imposing no-arbitrage and frontier conditions equivalent 
to a call option, and deﬁ  ning  Tt τ =− , one can obtain the following equation for E ,
12 () ()
r
T EA d B e d





























In the above equations  A σ  stands for the volatility of asset returns, r  is the risk-free interest rate, 
which we considered to be constant,τ is the time interval up to maturity and Φ  is the standardized 
cumulative normal function. Equation (3) has a simple interpretation. The ﬁ  rst term evaluates assets 
weighted by a coefﬁ  cient related to the probability of the call option being exercised; the second term 
weights the discounted nominal debt by a coefﬁ  cient slightly smaller given that losses are limited.  Articles | Part  II
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In turn, the put option value,P , can be calculated as 
  r
T A eE PB
τ − +− = (6)
In a risk-free world  0 P =  and asset value equals equity plus nominal debt discounted at the risk-
free rate.
Equation (3) has two unknowns, A  and  A σ . In order to obtain their value one needs to impose a 
second condition. One possibility is to say that E  also follows a geometric Brownian motion but with 
different parameters thanA .
Applying Itô’s lemma and equating the volatility terms, we obtain 
1 () EA EA d σσ =Φ (7)
where  E σ  is the volatility of equity returns.
Solving the system composed of equation (3) and (7) at each point in time, it is possible to obtain a 
time series for A  and  A σ .12 Substituting A  and E  into equation (2), we can then ﬁ  nd B  and cal-
culate the distance to distress, 2 d , the probability of default, 
2 () d Φ− , and the expected losses, P .
4.2. Application to the whole economy
The model presented so far was designed to be applied to listed ﬁ  rms for which information on market 
value and volatility of equity returns is widely available. The application of contingent claim analysis 
to economic sectors, though possible, requires several assumptions regarding the deﬁ  nition of equity 
and the volatility of equity returns. In sight of this, one can broadly distinguish two groups of sectors. 
On the one hand, we have those sectors that issue “shares”, some of them are even listed in stock 
exchanges. This applies to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, OMFI, OFI and INS13. For these sectors, as 
suggested by Gray et al. (2007), it makes sense to think that unlisted “shares”, if listed, would follow a 
trend similar to those that are effectively listed. Nevertheless, the way this behaviour is actually repro-
duced is not clear. In this study, unlisted “shares” value were estimated as the exponential of the sum 
of the logarithm of unlisted “shares” with the logarithmic distance of listed “shares” to their trend. We 
have calculated a different trend for each sector. As already mentioned, our data already incorporates 
this adjustment. Thus, non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, OMFI, OFI and INS equity were estimated assum-
ing that their “shares” are equivalent to call options on their assets with exercise price equal to their 
liabilities. For the volatility of equity returns, we used the volatility of the PSI-20 and the PSI-Financial 
Services for non-ﬁ  nancial corporations and OMFI, respectively, and the volatility of German 10-year 
bond yields for OFI and INS. For the central bank, though it issues “shares”, which are fully owned by 
the general government, there is no index to compare. Thus, we chose to deﬁ  ne central bank’s equity 
(12) Note that, unlike the original Black and Scholes (1973) model, the hypothesis of stationarity of  A σ  is neglected when solving this system.
(13) For INS most of its “shares” refer to household’s net equity on pension funds.  Part II  | Articles
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as its net welth position, which includes monetary gold and special drawing rights. This had been ex-
cluded from who-to-whom accounts since it had no counterparty sector. The volatility of Portuguese 
10-year bond yields was used as a proxy for the volatility of equity returns of the central bank. 
For those sectors that do not issue “shares”, the situation turns harder. This is the case for the general 
government, households and the rest of the world. Among these, the general government is probably 
the most difﬁ  cult case since it generally has a negative net ﬁ  nancial position. Some authors such as 
Sims (1999), Keller, Kunzel and Souto (2007), Gray et al (2007), Gray (2008) and Gapen et al (2008) 
suggested that general government assets could be estimated based on the different priority levels 
of its liabilities. However, none of the several options proposed is consensual. A ﬁ  rst hypothesis is to 
consider that the general government also includes the central bank. In this case, its assets would 
be largely made up of international currency reserves, future tax revenues and all types of real and 
ﬁ  nancial assets held by the general government. Similarly, liabilities would be composed by the mon-
etary base, the sum of future expenses and all sorts of liabilities, either in national or foreign currency. 
However, unlike liabilities in national currency, which are easier to control either by printing money or 
normatively, i.e. imposing credit restructuring; liabilities towards the rest of the world may require the 
acquisition of foreign currency. This leads these authors to compare national currency denominated 
liabilities to ﬁ  rm’s equity. Thus, in the same way ﬁ  rm’s equity grows according to its performance, 
domestic currency debt changes in value according to some exchange rate which reﬂ  ects how well 
the economy is performing. Firm’s equity devalues whenever new “shares” are issued or stock splits 
occur and grows whenever ﬁ  rms buy their own “shares”. Similarly, national currencies appreciate or 
depreciate depending on whether the central bank issues or withdraws currency. Finally, both can 
serve as a buffer whenever the ﬁ  nancial situation deteriorates. Seemingly simple, deﬁ  cit monetiza-
tion is usually associated with inﬂ  ationary periods and lack of credibility from national institutions with 
consequences in the long-term growth rate of the economy. Regardless of its pros and cons, if we 
would follow this hypothesis and using option pricing theory, general government assets could have 
been calculated considering that national currency liabilities were equal to a call option on assets with 
an exercise price equal to foreign currency liabilities. The volatility of national currency liabilities could 
then be inferred from exchange rate volatility. Although interesting, this hypothesis does not make 
sense in the Portuguese case for three reasons. Firstly, the institutional framework of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) embodies monetary policy independency of the central bank. Thus, un-
like ﬁ  rms, which are free to raise equity, the treaties governing the European Union explicitly prohibit 
countries participating in the euro area and, in general, all European Union states, to resort to deﬁ  cit 
monetization. Second, most public debt in euro area states is denominated in Euros. Thus, euro area 
countries liabilities would be almost negligible according to the application of the criteria explained 
above, which would distort our conclusions. Finally, though euro area countries have most of their 
liabilities denominated in their own currency, each of them has little power to inﬂ  uence monetary 
policy, which again contradicts the previous arguments for deﬁ  ning the prioritization of liabilities. 
A second alternative proposed by Castrén and Kavonius (2009) is to consider general government 
equity as the sum of its net ﬁ  nancial position plus “debt”, which is usually quoted in the market. This   Articles | Part  II
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method explores the fact that non mark-to-market liabilities have, at least theoretically, to be paid at 
face value while mark-to-market liabilities can be obtained at below par in secondary markets. Since 
most countries liabilities correspond to quoted debt, this method solves the equity deﬁ  nition problem. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in this case, equity would be greater, the greater the proportion 
of assets ﬁ  nanced by “debt”. Ultimately, this situation would mean that a country able to securitize all 
its liabilities would never default.
Finally, one may consider that liabilities in the hands of non-resident economic agents have prior-
ity over all other liabilities. The argument is that if a default would occur, resident economic agents 
would have to be more ﬂ  exible. This rationale seems to be more suitable to the Portuguese case. 
For Portugal, unlike the euro area as a whole, where most liabilities are ﬁ  nanced by residents in the 
euro area, liabilities are mainly held by non-residents. Although we have followed this principle, we 
recognize that this is not immune to criticism. Thus, from a legal standpoint it is difﬁ  cult to justify the 
fact that there are two securities with similar rights where one is being fulﬁ  lled and the other is not. It 
may also be argued that one needs only one security to enter in default in order to all others being 
considered automatically in default. In spite of these critics, applying option pricing theory, general 
government assets can be estimated using the volatility of Portuguese 10-year government bond 
yields as a proxy for risk. 
For the remaining two sectors, although they do not issue “shares”, they have a positive net worth, 
which eases the analysis. For households, it was considered that their net worth amounts to their 
real estate holdings plus their net ﬁ  nancial position. Risk-adjusted assets could then be estimated 
considering households’ net worth as equivalent to a call option on their assets with an exercise price 
equal to their liabilities.14 Similar to Castrén and Kavonius (2009), we used the volatility on 10-year 
national bond yields as a risk indicator. The rest of the world has a residual role in this model. Their 
inclusion is though necessary to close the ﬁ  nancial system and to transmit shocks to other sectors. 
Therefore, it was considered that its net worth amounts to a call option on its assets with an exercise 
price corresponding to its ﬁ  nancial liabilities. The VStoxx was used as a risk indicator.15 
Based on these deﬁ  nitions, and assuming that each sector liabilities equal the sum of its short-term 
liabilities plus 50% of its long-term liabilities; we have applied contingent claim analysis to the Portu-
guese economy.16 Chart 3 shows assets, the volatility of asset returns, the distance to distress and the 
leverage ratio for non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, OMFI, OFI, the general government and households.
Broadly, one can ﬁ  nd two very different patterns: before and after the mid-2007 ﬁ  nancial crisis. Thus, 
the period between January 2002 and June 2007 is characterized by a very substantial increase in 
assets for all sectors, especially OFI, whose assets grew 138%.17 On the other hand, households 
had the slowest growth (27%). This increase in assets led to a decrease in leverage ratios for all 
(14) For a more detailed analysis of the method used to estimate households’ real estate assets see Cardoso, Farinha e Lameira (2008).
(15) VStoxx is an implicit volatility measure based on the Dow Jones Eurosotxx 50.
(16) Notice that the value used for nominal debt corresponds to the standard in the literature in contingent claim analysis, which is based on the idea that 
in the long run ﬁ rms are able of adjusting their behavior in accordance with market developments. 
(17) Note that this increase is largely motivated by the changes carried on accounting rules regarding the derecognition of securitized assets.  Part II  | Articles
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sectors except the general government and households whose ratios grew only 11 p.p. and 1 p.p., 
respectively. In turn, the period after the summer of 2007 is characterized by a strong and sudden fall 
in most sectors assets, namely OFI (33%), non-ﬁ  nancial corporations (14%) and households (4%). 
Nevertheless, the central bank and the general government increased their assets by 98% and 31%, 
respectively. In the ﬁ  rst case, this reﬂ  ects the non-conventional monetary policy measures imple-
mented by the European Central Bank. The large decline in asset prices also had impact on sector 
leverage ratios (debt to assets). The largest increases were observed for non-ﬁ  nancial corporations 
(12 p.p.), OMFI (8 p.p.) and OFI (8 p.p.). Similar to other indicators, the volatility of asset returns and 
the distance to distress also show a different behaviour before and after the ﬁ  nancial crisis. Thus, the 
volatility of asset returns has an oscillating behaviour around relatively low values until the second 
quarter of 2007, when it has a strong and sudden rise. Likewise, the distance to distress evolves in 
accordance with assets and their volatility. It shows very high values for most of the sample, dropping 
dramatically after 2007. OMFI shows the lowest values for this indicator. The 2003 recession is also 
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5. SIMULATION
In order to evaluate the iterative scheme presented in section 3 we deﬁ  ned two shocks. The ﬁ  rst 
shock is a decrease in non-ﬁ  nancial corporations growth perspectives leading to a permanent de-
valuation in share prices of approximately 30%. The choice of shock magnitude was based on annual 
return analysis (250 business days rolling windows) of the PSI-20 index between 1993 and 2010. 
Assuming a normal distribution, it was chosen a shock equivalent to the 10th percentile. The second 
shock consists of an unrecoverable loss of 1.1% in “loans” granted by OMFI to households for house 
purchase and a loss of 6.6% in all other “loans” granted either by OMFI, OFI and non-ﬁ  nancial cor-
porations to households. We will interpret this mostly as “loans” for consumption and other purposes. 
A 4.3% loss in “debt”, “loans” and “other” granted to non-ﬁ  nancial corporation was also assumed. 
This corresponds to an annual loss of 0.4%, 2.2% and 1.4% in each of these credit segments with a 
horizon of three years. This accounts for the persistence usually posted by credit losses. The shock 
magnitude was designed under the assumption of a normal distribution with expected value equal to 
the average annual ﬂ  ow of non-performing loans as a share of the total stock of credit on each seg-
ment. The values chosen correspond to the 90th percentile.
Based on the values for debt and equity estimated in Section 4 for the fourth quarter of 2009, we have 
simulated the impact of these shocks based on the mechanism deﬁ  ned in Section 3 and contingent 
claim analysis. Regarding the volatility of equity returns, it was considered to change according to the 
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where  A σ  corresponds to the expected value of  A σ .18 The introduction of the above function 
is intended to incorporate the normal increase in volatility that generally occurs after a shock.
Consider the following example. Assume that non-ﬁ  nancial corporations suffer a negative shock of 
1 million Euros with impact on its equity market value. In addition consider that liabilities stand at 10 
million. To simplify, assume that both equity and debt of nonﬁ  nancial corporations are equally owned 
by other non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, OMFI, OFI, general government and households (20% each). 
Finally, consider that losses caused by this shock lead nonﬁ  nancial corporation’s debt to depreciate 
0.1% due to an increase in its probability of default. In this case, each of the sectors involved would 
have an initial total loss of 210 thousand Euros, in which 200 thousand Euros correspond to effect 1 
and 10 000 Euros to effect 2. In turn, this loss would then be reﬂ  ected in the shareholders of those 
sectors affected by these losses and so on. Effect 2 is calculated using contingent claim analysis, 
which takes into account each sector leverage ratio and the volatility of its equity returns.
Chart 4 shows current and accumulated losses as a proportion of initial equity for our two shocks in 
an iterative scheme.19 Current losses tend to zero after a few iterations signalling shock convergence. 
(18) In the current application, we used T B , E and  2 d  from the previous iteration. Similarly,  A σ is substituted by  A σ  from the previous iteration. Note 
that, as in many other applications of the Merton model, the hypothesis of constant volatility is violated.
(19) The algorithm used in this study considers 20 iterations.  Part II  | Articles
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Likewise, accumulated losses converge to a value below initial equity indicating that all sectors are 
able to absorb the shock. For the ﬁ  rst shock, the most affected sector is OMFI, whose equity suffers 
a loss of 83%. It follows non-ﬁ  nancial corporations and the rest of the world with losses amounting 
to 45% and 40% of their initial equity, respectively. Overall, the shock led to a devaluation of around 
18% of all ﬁ  nancial assets in the economy (360 billion Euros). The second shock shows a slightly 
different transmission pattern in the sense that OMFI is affected before all other sectors. In the end, 
OMFI is once more the most affected sector with losses summing up to 47% of its equity. Losses in 
other sectors are considerably lower. In sum, the shock led to a total loss slightly above 4% of total 
assets (94 billion Euros).
In order to better understand the impact of credit risk in the economy we have decomposed total 
losses for both shocks in effect 1 and effect 2. Under this model, this can be done by assuming that 
the volatility of equity returns is zero for all sectors. In practice, this implies no losses associated with 
changes in debt’s quality. Chart 5 compares total losses for the cases with and without credit risk. For 
the ﬁ  rst shock, the difference between these two cases, i.e. losses that can be directly assigned to 
Chart 4
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credit risk sum up to 8500 million Euros, 0.35% of initial assets and only 2.3% of total losses originat-
ed by the shock. For the second shock, this ﬁ  gure was less than 600 million Euros, or 0.02% of initial 
assets and 0.6% of the total losses. We can then conclude that effect 1 is considerably greater than 
effect 2 for any of these two shocks. Despite this superiority, and given the nonlinearities inherent in 
debt valuation models, it is appropriate to examine how much is this effect for shocks of greater mag-
nitude. Chart 6 shows the losses caused by effect 2 after 20 iterations for different shock magnitudes.
Although effect 2 is clearly smaller as compared to shock 1 for shocks of low magnitude, it seems 
to have an exponential behaviour. Notice that for shocks in “shares” price in excess of 35%, effect 
2 tends to inﬁ  nity signalling the collapse of the system. In other words, for shocks in non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations equity above 35% there is at least one sector whose equity becomes negative before all 
losses are dissipated, thus preventing shock convergence. As shown in Chart 4 this sector is OMFI 
for our two shocks. Since contingent claim analysis cannot be estimated with negative equity, the 
system is said to become unsolvable.
Chart 7 shows all combinations of loss rates in each credit segment that lead the system to collapse. 
The system seems particularly sensitive to losses on credit to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations (“loans”, 
“debt” and “other”). A loss of 11.5% in these instruments is sufﬁ  cient to destabilize the system. In 
opposition, the economy appears to be quite resilient to shocks in “loans” for consumption and other 
purposes as it takes a loss of more than 50% on the whole exposure to this type of “loans” to drive 
down the system. Notwithstanding these ﬁ  ndings, we must take two facts into account. Firstly, these 
ﬁ  gures represent ﬁ  nal losses. Thus, assuming a loss-given-default of 50%, a ﬁ  nal loss of 11.5% in 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations credit implies a ﬂ  ow of non-performing loans of 23% of the whole credit 
exposure to this sector. Secondly, given the high correlation between these credit segments, the 
greatest risk comes from the intermediate points rather than from the extreme ones. For instance, a 
combined shock of 3% in mortgage “loans”, 13% in “loans” for consumption and other purposes and 
Chart 5
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7% in credit to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations is sufﬁ  cient to lead the system to collapse.
Chart 6 and 7 illustrate a very important phenomenon in this type of networks. After a certain point 
the shock transmission process becomes highly nonlinear so that it becomes difﬁ  cult to stop. This is 
consistent with the ﬁ  ndings of Castrén and Kavonius (2009), Allen and Gale (2000), Gallegati, Green-
wald, Stiglitz and Richiardi (2008) and Haldane (2009) who argue for the existence of a tipping point. 
Once crossed this point, all interconnections in the economy become ampliﬁ  cation channels instead 
of shock absorbers. This leads Haldane (2009) to conclude that this network, though apparently ro-
bust, is extremely fragile because the boundary between stability and depression is very weak. In this 
model, the existence of absorbing nodes, able of receiving negative shocks and not passing them to 
other sectors, is essential to stop the contagion. In advanced economies, the general government is 
probably the sector better prepared to play this role. This happens essentially for two reasons. Firstly, 
since this sector does not issue “shares”, it does not produce effect 1. Secondly, general government 
liabilities are generally considered to be of higher quality because their resources are somehow only 
limited by total national wealth. Thus, even in a context of ﬁ  nancial crisis, this sector is able of rais-
ing funds imposing taxes on those who are better off, generally, households. As a consequence, the 
general government usually shows low volatility in equity returns. Without a credible ﬁ  scal policy, 
where there are no doubts on general government’s ability to appeal to households to ﬁ  nance its 
expenditure, and in sight of a non convergent shock, international intervention may be needed to 
prevent contagion to the whole economic system.20
(20) A shock is considered as non convergent if it produces sufﬁ cient losses to lead at least one sector to bankruptcy.
Chart 6
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6. LIMITATIONS TO THE ANALYSIS
Like any other method, the model presented in this study has some limitations. The whole exercise 
is conditioned by contingent claim analysis own caveats, for instance the model is largely dependent, 
not on reality, but on markets perception of reality. The model does not sign what the market does 
not perceive. This is visible in cases like Enron and even on the current ﬁ  nancial crisis, where the 
market had a delayed reaction. There are also other technical aspects which are often criticized. For 
instance, the assumption that assets follow a Brownian motion, the violation of the return on assets 
constant volatility assumption, and the subjectivity around the distress barrier and the horizon of the 
analysis.
There are also some limitations related to the degree of disaggregation of the analysis. Whenever 
the analysis is focused on the probability of default of a sector as a whole, we are underestimating 
the risks in the economy broadly for two reasons. Firstly, any analysis at the aggregate level tends 
to ignore the heterogeneity within each sector. For example, households have a largely positive net 
position. However, it is known that this wealth is unequally distributed, meaning that the risk in house-
hold’s debt depends on each individual borrower. Second, when we analyze the data in aggregate 
we ignore what Haldane (2009) calls small world property. Consider, for example, that a particular 
economic sector makes most of its transactions with a small number of companies. The existence of 
this type of structure leads shocks to propagate and grow very quickly inside clusters before passing 
out. In other words, the existence of small worlds increases the likelihood of a local problem to swell 
and become global. Thus it might be useful to introduce in the model some measure correlated with 
the level of relational entropy within each sector.
7. CONCLUSION
This study has broadly three goals. First, it aspires to highlight the importance of inter-sector relations 
in the economy. In particular, it places an emphasis on the overwhelming role played by the ﬁ  nancial 
system as the centre of this dense network of relations. In this context, we aimed at estimating a net-
work of bilateral balance-sheets similar to that of Castrén and Kavonius (2009) for the euro area. The 
results obtained for Portugal were quite similar to those achieved for the euro area with the ﬁ  nancial 
system concentrating 2/3 of all bilateral relations in the economy. Nevertheless, Portuguese non-
ﬁ  nancial corporations presented a net ﬁ  nancial position below the euro area aggregate. 
Secondly, this study sought to apply contingent claim analysis to the whole economy. The method 
proposed by Gray et al. (2007) has been adapted to the speciﬁ  cities of a small country belonging 
to the euro area. The results were in line with expectations. Assets have grown considerably until 
the 2007-2008 ﬁ  nancial crises. For households and the general government, this growth has been 
fuelled mostly by debt, leading to an increase in leverage ratios. At the same time, the volatility of as-
set returns has been kept low for most of the sample, leading to high values on distance to distress. 
This pattern has changed suddenly in 2007 after the ﬁ  rst rumours on the sub-prime credit crisis. 
Assets and distance to distress started then to decrease while the volatility of asset returns and the   Part II  | Articles
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leverage ratio increased steeply. The worst situation was recorded for OMFI, with the distance to 
distress falling to below 3, followed by non-ﬁ  nancial corporations. 
Finally, we analyzed the inter-sector shock transmission mechanism and the role played by risk both 
on this mechanism and on each sector solvability. We have simulated two shocks: a decrease on 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations future proﬁ  ts and a simultaneous loss on mortgage “loans” granted by 
OMFI, all other “loans” granted to households and “loans”, “debt” and “other” granted to non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations. This has allowed not only to measure direct effects from loss propagation but also the 
nonlinear effects of the accumulation and transmission of risk in the economy. The application of 
both shocks to an economy with and without risk allowed us to separate both effects, leading to the 
conclusion that the former represent the vast majority of losses. Nevertheless, given the non-linearity 
associated with risk accumulation and transmission, losses related with risk should not be neglected. 
Depending on the shock, there is a level of losses which, once crossed, avoids the convergence of 
the system, leading the system to collapse. These simulations also highlight the importance of the 
banking system in the economy. Any shock in this sector, even if of lesser magnitude, after a certain 
level tends to have more impact on the overall system than a shock in any other sector. This comes 
both from the large exposure that all sectors have in relation with OMFI, but also from its current situ-
ation characterized by some fragility.
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